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Abstract
This research advances the hypothesis that resource abundant economies character-
ized by a socially cohesive workforce and network externalities triggered the emergence of
e¢ ciency-enhancing inclusive institutions designed to restrict mobility and to enhance the
attachment of community members to the local labor market. However, the persistence
of these institutions, and the inter-generational transmission of their value, ultimately re-
sulted in the misallocation of talents across occupations and a reduction in the long-run
level of income per capita in the economy as a whole. Exploiting variation in resource in-
tensity across the American Midwest during its initial development, the empirical analysis
establishes that higher initial resource-intensity in 1860 is indeed associated with greater
community participation over the subsequent 150 years, and reduced mobility and labor
misallocation in the contemporary period.
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1 Introduction
The transition from an epoch of stagnation to an era of sustained economic growth has trig-
gered one of the most remarkable transformations in the course of human history. While living
standards in the world economy stagnated during the millennia preceding the Industrial Rev-
olution, income per capita has undergone an unparalleled fourteen-fold increase over the past
two centuries, profoundly altering the level and distribution of education, health, and wealth
across the globe. Nevertheless, the rise in the standard of living has not been universally shared
among individuals and societies. Inequality, which had been modest until the nineteenth cen-
tury, has widened considerably and the ratio of income per capita between the richest and
the poorest regions of the world has been magnied from a moderate 3:1 ratio in 1820 to a
staggering 18:1 ratio in 2000 (Maddison (2008)).
Theories of comparative economic development have highlighted multiple proximate and
ultimate factors that have contributed to the vast inequity in living standards across the globe.
The role of geography, culture, and institutions, the contribution of the level and diversity of
innate and acquired human capital, as well as the impact of the forces of colonization and
globalization have been central to a debate about the origin of the di¤erential timing of the
transition from stagnation to growth and the remarkable transformation in the world income
distribution.
The e¤ects of institutional factors on the growth process have been largely segmented into
two opposing forces (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). The emergence of inclusive institutions,
typically in homogeneous socially cohesive populations, has been widely viewed as a signicant
catalyst in the process of economic development. These institutions facilitated the protection
of property rights, and provided economic incentives that stimulated the entrepreneurial spirit
and the process of accumulation in the economy as a whole. Inclusive institutions therefore
fostered economic activity, technological development, and knowledge creation and di¤usion,
and variation in their presence has contributed to divergence in productivity across the globe
(North (1981), Landes (1998), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)).
In contrast, the implementation of exclusive institutions in environments characterized by
a conict of interest between the elite and the masses has been regarded as highly detrimental
to development. These institutions, which are often associated with colonization, were designed
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to maintain the political power of the elite and to preserve existing inequality. They stied the
incentives for investment in physical and human capital in the economy as a whole, and limited
the scope for innovations, leading to inferior development trajectories and reduced productivity
in the long run (Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997, 2000), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001,
2002, 2012)).
A particular type of exclusive institution, designed to restrict the mobility of workers from
the agricultural to the industrial sector, emerged in economies marked by a conict of interest
between the industrial and the landed elites. While complementarity between physical and
human capital provided the industrial elite with an incentive to implement inclusive institutions
that would induce workers to invest in human capital (Galor and Moav (2006)), landowners,
whose livelihood was endangered by the mobility of workers from the local (rural) to the global
(urban) environment, had the incentive to block the provision of education (Galor et al., (2009))
and to implement mobility restricting coercive institutions (Dell (2012), Naidu and Yuchtman
(2012)), leading to delayed industrialization, reduced human capital formation, and lowered
productivity in the long-run.
This research advances the hypothesis that resource abundant economies characterized
by a socially cohesive workforce and network externalities triggered the emergence of e¢ ciency-
enhancing inclusive institutions designed to restrict mobility and to enhance the attachment of
community members to the local labor market. Nevertheless, the persistence of these inclusive
institutions that were designed to internalize the positive externalities in the local community,
and the inter-generational transmission of their value, may have ultimately led to labor misal-
location and a reduction in the long-run level of income per capita in the economy as a whole.
Thus, as the process of development has altered economic opportunity in the global economy,
while reducing the importance of historical networks, the persistence of inclusive institutions
that were optimally designed for an earlier stage of development, has inadvertently led to labor
misallocation in the contemporary era.1
The test of the proposed theory is based on the experience of the American Midwest over
the past 150 years. This region provides an ideal setting for an empirical assessment of the
theory for several reasons. First, the Midwest is a geographically and culturally homogeneous
1This is consistent with the observation from diverse locales that close-knit working class and farming commu-
nities often stubbornly resist economic change (Gans (1962), Elder and Conger (2000), Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2006), Willis (1974), Kornblum (1977)).
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region in which extractive institutions have not emerged. Second, the rapid development of the
Midwest, in the aftermath of the railroad expansion of the 1850s, had a signicant community
component. In line with a fundamental element of the theory, ethnic churches in this region
played a pivotal role in forming communities, characterized by economic networks and social
support systems based on nationality and residential location. Third, conditions that a¤ected
economic opportunities and the initial level of investment in community services 150 years ago
are unlikely to be relevant in the contemporary period.
In the early stages of the development of the Midwest, counties that were located near a
canal, Great Lakes harbor, or railroad line enjoyed a signicant economic advantage. Comple-
mentarity between these resources and labor inputs, would have led according to the theory to
investments in the community services designed to restrict mobility in these resource-rich coun-
ties. This resource advantage dissipated, however, once the railroad network had penetrated
the entire region and the canals had lost their importance. Thus di¤erences in labor market
choices across counties in the contemporary period can be plausibly attributed to the persistent
attachment to community institutions, rather than the persistent e¤ect of initial resources.
The theory suggests that inclusive institutions in historically resource-rich counties pro-
vided a persistently higher level of community services, designed to restrict mobility and to
enhance the complementarity between human and natural and physical resources in the local
community. Church participation is indeed greater in historically resource-rich counties and
this di¤erence has persisted since 1870. Moreover, a signicantly larger fraction of students in
those counties are enrolled in parochial schools.
The theory further indicates that individuals born in the contemporary period in his-
torically resource-rich counties, long after the ethnic networks that gave rise to the inclusive
community institutions dissipated, are nevertheless less mobile. The evidence suggests that
individuals born in historically resource-rich Midwestern counties are indeed represented dis-
proportionately in less mobile occupations, and are signicantly less likely to migrate from their
county of birth, despite the fact that the available composition of jobs, government expendi-
tures on education and other public goods, educational attainment, and test scores do not di¤er
between resource rich and poor counties in the contemporary period. A one standard deviation
increase in the measure of resource intensity in the past would result in as much as a 14 per-
cent decline in migration. Moreover, the income of individuals born in historically resource-rich
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counties is signicantly lower despite the fact that income in their county is not signicantly
lower. Thus, inclusive institutions, which were designed specically to increase e¢ ciency by
internalizing network externalities may generate labor misallocation in the long-run.2
2 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in the process of development. In every period
the economy produces a single homogeneous good that can be used for either consumption or
investment. The good is produced in a local, geographically isolated, community as well as in
a global perfectly competitive environment, using labor and a location-specic non-producible
resource.
The local economy consists of a large number of individuals. They are homogeneous in
their labor endowment, and a subset of them owns the non-producible resource. Labor produc-
tivity is higher in the local community, reecting the positive externalities of a community-based
economic network, which is absent in the global, anonymous, market. However, individual
resource owners are too small to account for these externalities when making their prot-
maximizing employment decisions, and a competitive allocation would result in a sub-optimal
level of employment in the local economy and excessive exit to the global economy. This mar-
ket failure leads to the formation of inclusive institutions that provide community services,
designed to increase the attachment of workers to the local community and to increase the
aggregate well being of the local population.
2.0.1 Production of Final Output
The aggregate output produced in the global market; Y Gt ; is governed by a linear production
function using labor as the only factor of production. In particular, Y Gt = aL
G
t ; where a > 0;
and LGt is the number of individuals employed in the global economy. The wage in the global
economy is therefore constant over time, i.e., wGt = a  wG, for all t:
The local economy consists of a large number of perfectly competitive rms that produce
the nal output with a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology, using
labor and the immobile, location-specic, resource.
2From a welfare perspective, the proposed theory indicates that individuals born in historically resource-rich
counties are as well o¤ staying versus moving. From an economic perspective, however, the intergenerational
transmission of local attachment appears to have generated a substantial labor misallocation.
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The aggregate output produced by resource owners in the local community at time t; Y ct ;
is
Y ct = AtF (X;L
c
t); (1)
where X is the aggregate amount of the location-specic resource, Lct is the number of individu-
als employed in the local community, and At is the level of technology in the local environment
in period t:
The production function, F (X;Lct); is neoclassical. The marginal productivity of both
factors of production are positive and diminishing, satisfying the neoclassical boundary con-
ditions that assure the existence of an interior solution to the producersprot-maximization
problem. Moreover, the two factors of production are complements in the production process,
i.e., FXL(X;Lct) > 0: In particular,
Y ct = AtX
1 (Lct)
;  2 (0; 1): (2)
Labor productivity in the local community reects a positive externality from the local
community-based economic network. In particular, the level of technology in the local envi-
ronment in period t increases at a decreasing rate with the level of employment in the local
community, Lct ; in period t, i.e.,
At = A(L
c
t); (3)
where
A0(Lct) > 0; A
00(Lct) < 0: (4)
In particular,
At = (L
c
t)
;  2 (0; 1): (5)
Resource owners in the local community operate in a perfectly competitive environment.
In particular, they are too small to internalize their employment decisions on the aggregate
productivity, At: In every period t; given the wage rate in the local community, wct ; and the
level of productivity, At; they choose the level of employment of labor, Lct ; so as to maximize
prots. That is,
fLctg = arg max[AtF (X;Lct)  wctLct ]: (6)
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Given the xed supply of the resource in the local community, X; producersaggregate
inverse demand for labor is therefore,
wct = A(L
c
t)FL(X;L
c
t) = X
1 (Lct)
+ 1: (7)
The positive externality from local employment is assumed to be limited so as to assure that
the marginal productivity of workers diminishes, implying that
+  < 1: (A1)
The aggregate rental rate on the location-specic resource, rct ; is therefore,
rct = AtF (X;L
c
t)  wctLct = (1  )X1 (Lct)+: (8)
2.0.2 Local Institutions
The local community cooperates to provide services designed to enhance local ties and thus to
reduce the incentive of workers to migrate from the local market into the global one. These
services can be viewed as a social infrastructure, provided by the church and other inclusive
community institutions, that facilitate social interactions and provide social support. All indi-
viduals who are employed in the local economy participate in the community institutions and
benet from their provision of these services.
Each member of the local community derives utility from community services. The net
value of these services for each community member in period t+ 1 is, gt+1; in terms of the nal
output. This value is a¤ected positively by: (i) the resources invested in the provision of the
services in period t+ 1, vt+1; and (ii) the value of the services in the past generation, gt; which
is transmitted imperfectly across generations.3
In particular, the value of community services for each local worker of generation t+ 1,
gt+1; is
gt+1 = g(vt+1) + gt: (9)
where  2 (0; 1):
Resources invested in the provision of the community services are productive but their
e¤ect is diminishing, i.e., for all vt+1 > 0; g(vt+1) > 0, g0(vt+1) > 0; and g00(vt+1)  0: Further-
more, limvt+1!0 g0(vt+1) = 1 and limvt+1!1 g0(vt+1) = 0; assuring the direct protability of
3This last term reects the idea that social infrastructure established by the preceding generation a¤ects
social interactions and social support in the current period, but not as strongly as current infrastructure.
6
positive, but nite, investment in the community services. In particular,
g(vt+1) = v

t+1;  2 (0; 1): (10)
Investments in community services are nanced by taxes imposed on the community as
a whole, prior to the allocation of labor between the local and the global market. Hence this
tax rates does not a¤ect the mobility of workers from the local to the global economy.
2.0.3 Workers
In every period t; workers in the local community face the choice of employment in either
the local or the global market. Those who choose to remain in the local community earn the
competitive local wage, wct ; and benet from the value of community services, gt: However,
if they choose employment in the global market they relinquish the benets of these services,
while earning the competitive global wage, wG:
Hence, as depicted in Figure 1, labor allocation between the local and the global market
will be determined such that
wct + gt = w
G; (11)
where the size of the local population L is su¢ ciently large so as to assure that in equilibrium
some individuals will choose employment in the global market. Equivalently, this implies that
if the entire local population were to be employed in the local market, the competitive wage
that would emerge in the local market, wcmin  A(L)FL(X;L); would be such that for all gt  0
wcmin + gt < w
G: (A2)
As follows from the competitiveness of the local labor market, wct = A(L
c
t)FL(X;L
c
t);
and thus as depicted in Figure 1, the level of employment in the local market in period t; Lct ,
is determined by
A(Lct)FL(X;L
c
t) + gt = w
G: (12)
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Figure 1. Labor allocation between the local and the global markets
Given the labor endowment in the local community in every time period, L; the level of
employment in the local market in period t; Lct ; and the level of employment in global market,
LGt ; are such that;
Lct + L
G
t = L: (13)
Given the properties of the production function, it follows from (12), that for any given
level of location-specic resource, X > 0; the level of employment in the local community,
Lct ; is a single-valued function of the value of community services, gt: Moreover, given the
existence of an immobile, location-specic resource, X > 0; and the neoclassical properties of
the production function (i.e., limLct!0A(L
c
t)FL(Xt; L
c
t) = 1 > wG); employment in the local
market is strictly positive, even if the local community does not provide any services.
Thus, for all gt  0;
Lct = 
1
1  

wG   gt
 1
+ 1 X
1 
1    L(gt;X) > 0; (14)
where @Lct=@gt > 0 and @L
c
t=@X > 0: Holding the value of community services constant,
employment in the local community increases with the amount of the location-specic resource,
X; and holding the amount of the location-specic resource, X; constant, employment in the
local community increases with the value of the services, gt:
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2.0.4 Optimal Provision of the Community Services
Suppose that in every period the aggregate level of investment in community services is chosen
so as to maximize the well being of the community as whole.4 The aggregate level of investment
in community services at time t; vt; will be the level that maximizes the sum of output in the
local community, Y ct ; the wage income of local workers in the global market, L
G
t w
G; and the
value of the services for the local workers, gtLct ; net of resources invested in community services,
vt; i.e.,
vt = arg maxY
c
t + L
G
t w
G + gtL
c
t   vt: (15)
Noting that LGt = L  Lct and wct = wG   gt; and using (8), it follows that
vt = arg max(1  )X1 (Lct)+ + L wG   vt; (16)
where Lct = L(gt;X); and gt = g(vt) + gt 1:
Lemma 1 The aggregate level of investment in the provision of community services, vt, is:
 a positive, increasing function
vt = !(L
c
t) > 0;
of the level of employment in the local community, Lct > 0; where !
0(Lct) > 0;
 a positive, increasing function,
vt = v(X; gt 1) > 0;
of the amount of the location-specic resource, X; and a concave function of the value of
community services transmitted from the previous generation, gt 1  0; where
vx(X; gt 1) > 0, vg(X; gt 1) > 0; and vgg(X; gt 1) < 0
if for all t,
g(vt) < w
c
min;
4Community members are not altruistic and therefore they do not consider the e¤ect of their decisions on
the well being of future generations. Moreover, the community does not account for the e¤ect of services that
it currently provides and thus the level of employment on the future rental rate of the local resource. Given the
positive e¤ect of local employment on the rental rate, if this e¤ect were accounted for, investment in community
services would be even higher at each point in time, leaving the dynamic analysis that follows qualitatively
unchanged.
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where   (1    )(1  )= < 1:5
Proof. (see Appendix).
2.1 Evolution of Local Employment
The evolution of employment in the local community fLctg1t=0, (which is synonymous with
participation in the inclusive institution), is governed by the evolution of the value of community
services for each community member, fgtg1t=0; as well as by the endowment of the location-
specic resource, X.
2.1.1 Evolution of the Value of the Community Services
The time path of the value of community services,fgtg1t=0; is governed by
gt+1 = g(vt+1) + gt; (17)
where as follows from Lemma 1, vt+1 = v(X; gt); and thus the evolution of gt is governed by
the one-dimensional rst-order di¤erence equation,
gt+1 = g(v(X; gt)) + gt   (gt;X): (18)
Lemma 2 The evolution of the value of the services in the local community, fgtg1t=0; as de-
picted in Figure 2, is governed by the one-dimensional, rst-order di¤erence equation
gt+1 =  (gt;X):
  (gt;X) is positive, increasing and strictly concave in gt for all X > 0;
 (0;X) > 0;
 g(gt;X) > 0:
 gg(gt;X) < 0
  (gt;X) is positive and increasing in X > 0 for all gt  0;
 x(gt;X) > 0;
5This condition is satised if the value of the additional resources invested in community services, g(vt); does
not exceed the minimal competitive wage dened in A2.
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 The system has a unique and globally stable steady-state equilibrium, g(X); i.e.,
lim
t!1 gt = g(X) > 0; for all g0  0:
where
g0(X) > 0:
Proof. (see Appendix).
As follow from Lemma 2 and as depicted in Figures 2 and 3, the evolution of community
services approaches a steady-state level g(X) > 0: The higher is the amount of the local
resources the higher will be the level of community services in the steady state.
Figure 2. The evolution of the value of the local community services
Corollary 1 Consider two local communities, a resource abundant community, with resource
endowment, XH ; and a resource poor community with resource endowment, XL: The gap in
the value of community services will persist over time.
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Figure 3. Persistent gap in the value of community services
in resource rich, XH ; and resource poor, XL; areas
2.1.2 Evolution of Employment in the Local Community
The evolution of employment in the local community and the accompanying participation in
the inclusive institutions, fLctg1t=0; is governed by by the evolution of the value of community
services for each community member, fgtg1t=0:.
As follows from (14) and (27), Lct = L(gt; X) is monotonically increasing in both gt and
X: Hence, given the monotonically increasing evolution of gt towards steady-state equilibrium,
g(X); the level of employment in the local community, Lct ; increases monotonically as well and
it has a higher level the higher is the resource endowment, X:
Furthermorethe evolution of the level of employment has a unique and globally stable
steady-state equilibrium, Lc(X); i.e.,
lim
t!1L
c
t = L(g(X); X)  Lc(X) for all Lc0 > 0; (19)
where as follows from (27) and Lemma 2,
dLc(X)
dX
=
@L(g(X); X)
@g
g0(X) +
@L(g(X); X)
@X
> 0:
Corollary 2  The level of employment in the local community, Lct = L(gt; X); increases
monotonically over time
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 The evolution of the level of employment in the local community has a unique and globally
stable steady-state equilibrium, Lc(X); i.e.,
lim
t!1L
c
t =
Lc(X) for all Lc0 > 0:
 Consider two local communities, a resource abundant community, with resource endow-
ment, XH ; and a resource poor community with resource endowment, XL: Employment
will be persistently higher in the resource abundant community, i.e., for every period t;
Lct(X
H) > Lct(X
L):
2.2 Persistence of Institutions and Long-Run Misallocation
This section establishes that while the emergence of local institutions that internalize the
positive externalities from employment in the local community is benecial in the short-run,
the persistence of these institutions and the intergenerational transmission of local a¢ nity over
time could lead to a reduction in the level of income per capita in the long-run in the economy
as a whole.
Proposition 1 establishes that the formation of local institutions in period 0; that inter-
nalize the positive externalities from employment in the local community, increases aggregate
output in the economy as a whole,
Proposition 1 An increase in the equilibrium level of employment in the local community in
period 0, Lc0; increases aggregate output in the economy in period 0, Y
G
0 + Y
c
0 :
Proof. As follows from (1), noting that Y Gt = w
GLGt = w
G(L  LCt );
@[Y c0 + Y
G
0 ]
@Lc0
= [A(Lc0)FL(X;L
c
0) +A
0(Lc0)F (X;L
c
0)]  wG: (20)
Furthermore, as follows from (12), in the absence of community services, wc0 = A(L
c
0)FL(X;L
c
0) =
wG and therefore
@[Y c0 + Y
G
0 ]
@Lc0
= A0(Lc0)F (X;L
c
0) > 0: (21)
Although the establishment of inclusive institutions increases output in the short run,
Proposition 2 establishes that it may reduce the long-run level of output in the economy. In
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particular, inclusive institutions will have an adverse e¤ect on long-run output if the steady-
state value of community services, g(X); exceeds the contribution of an additional worker to
the output in the local community via its a¤ect on aggregate productivity, A0(Lc); i.e.,
A0(Lc(X))F (X; Lc(X)) < g(X): (A3)
Proposition 2 Under A3, a movement of worker from the local to the global economy will
increase the steady-state level of aggregate output:
Proof. As follows from (1), noting that Y Gt = w
GLGt = w
G(L  LCt );
@[ Y c + Y G]
@ Lc
= [A(Lc)FL(X; L
c) +A0(Lc)F (X; Lc)]  wG: (22)
Furthermore, as follows from (12), A(Lc)FL(X; Lc) = wG   g(X) and therefore
@[ Y c + Y G]
@ Lc
= A0(Lc)F (X; Lc)  g(X) < 0: (23)
Corollary 3 If the value of the local network dissipates in the long run (i.e., if A(Lc) = 1);
then the persistence of the inclusive institution will generate a larger reduction in the level of
steady-state output in resource rich communities.
Proof. As follows from (5), A(Lc) = 1; and thus A0(Lc) = 0; if and only if  = 0: Hence,
substituting into (23);
@[ Y c + Y G]
@ Lc
=   g(X)j=0 < 0: (24)
Moreover, as follows from the proof of Lemma 2,
@2[ Y c + Y G]
@ Lc@X
=   g0(X)
=0
< 0: (25)
Hence, inclusive institutions, which were designed specically to increase e¢ ciency by
internalizing network externalities may generate labor misallocation in the long-run. This
misallocation will be larger in resource-rich communities.
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3 Testing the Theory
The point of departure for the empirical analysis is the settlement and rapid development
of the American Midwest in the middle of the nineteenth century. The theory is tested by
exploiting variation in initial resource abundance across counties in the Midwest and its e¤ect
on the formation of local inclusive institutions and the emergence of labor misallocation in the
long-run.
3.1 Institutional Setting
The Midwest began to be settled in the early nineteenth century with the expansion of the
national canal system (Fishlow (2000)). However, it was only with the arrival of the railroad
that the Midwest took o¤ on a steeper growth trajectory. Before 1850 the Midwest had less
than one thousand miles of track, but almost ten thousand were added by 1857 (Meyer (1989)).
Improved rail transportation spurred industrialization and this regions share of national man-
ufacturing increased rapidly between 1860 and 1920, with almost half of this increase occurring
in the 1860s (Meyer (1989)). This increase in economic activity led, in turn, to an increase in
the demand for labor. In 1810, approximately 6 percent of the labor force (outside the southern
states) resided in the Midwest. By 1860, this share had increased to 41 percent, with a further
increase to 51 percent by 1880, after which regional growth converged to the national average
(Margo (1999)).
The preceding discussion suggests that 1860, just after the railroad boom, would serve
as an appropriate point in time at which initial conditions in the Midwest were established.
Settlement patterns and railroad expansion over the 1850-1900 period presented in Figure 4
are consistent with this view. Restricting attention to states that had been settled by 1860, the
Midwest consists of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.6 Using
county-level census data it is apparent that the number of incorporated counties in those states
increases sharply from 1850 to 1860 and then attens out. Moreover, the number of these
counties with a direct access to the railroad system also increases steeply over the 1850-1870
period, growing thereafter at a slower rate.7
6Missouri, the only pre-Civil War slave state in the Midwest, is excluded from the analysis.
7 Information on railroads, obtained from the Historical Map Archive at the University of Alabama. Railroad
maps were used to construct a county-level binary variable indicating whether any part of a railroad ran through
the county in a given year. Railroad maps were unavailable in some census years in which case maps that were
closest in vintage to those census years are used (the discrepancy never exceeded three years).
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Figure 4. Early growth in the Midwest
The rapid expansion of the railroad system and the economic activity that accompanied it
led to a steep increase in the population of the Midwest as well as an inux of foreign migrants.
Using county-level census statistics, the total population in the seven Midwestern states in the
sample grew from less than 5 million in 1850 to 20 million in 1900. The number of foreign-born
migrants nearly tripled between 1850 and 1860, reaching close to 15 percent of the population.
Labor markets in the nineteenth century could be divided into three segments: a stable segment
with permanent employment, an unstable segment with periodic short-term unemployment,
and a marginal but highly exible segment characterized by spells of long-term and short-term
unemployment (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982)). Migrants being newcomers to the U.S.
market typically ended up in the unstable and marginal segments, where the uncertain labor
demand and the lack of information about their ability and diligence naturally provided an
impetus for the formation of ethnic job networks (Conzen (1976), Hoerder (1991)).
Accounts by contemporary observers and an extensive social history literature indicate
that friends and kin from the origin community in Europe played an important role in securing
jobs for migrants in the Midwest in the nineteenth century and the rst quarter of the twentieth
century. As an immigrant to the Midwest put it, The only way you got a job [was] through
somebody at work who got you in(Bodnar, Simon, and Weber (1982): 56). Early historical
studies used census data, which provide occupations and country of birth, to identify ethnic
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clusters in particular locations and occupations (Hutchinson (1956), Gordon, Edwards, and
Reich (1982)). More recently, social historians have linked parish registers and county data
in specic European sending communities to census and church records in the United States
to construct the entire chain of migration from those communities as it unfolded over time.
This research has documented the formation of new settlements in the Midwest by pioneering
migrants, the subsequent channeling of migrants from the origin community in Europe to these
settlements, as well as the movement of groups from the original settlement to new satellite
colonies elsewhere in the United States (Gjerde (1985), Kamphoefner (1987), Bodnar (1985)).
Once an ethnic group had established a toe-hold(Thistlethwaite (1991)) or a beach-
head(Bodnar, Simon, and Weber (1982)) in a particular industry or location, it was essential
to maintain and even consolidate that presence. Given the variety of economic opportunities
in the United States, individuals and small groups drawn from the same parish in Europe often
had an incentive to move and seek employment in new locations. The stability of the local
community in the United States, based on a common national origin rather than narrower
social a¢ liations, was thus essential for the viability of the labor market network. Because ex
post social sanctions would have little impact once the individual or small group had moved, a
more e¤ective strategy would have been to discourage exit ex ante. As described in the previ-
ous section, one strategy to discourage exit would have been to establish inclusive community
institutions, which provided an infrastructure that facilitated social interactions among their
members. These social interactions would, in turn, have supported economic networks and
social support systems, which members of the community would forego when they left.
3.2 Measuring Resource Abundance
The theory indicates that investments in the community institution and, hence, the level of
community services would have been greater in resource-rich locations. However, resources
in a county are not directly observed and they may reect multiple attributes, including the
physical infrastructure and natural endowments. The construction of a single resource statistic
takes advantage of the fact that a resource-rich county would have typically supported the
entry of a larger number of ethnic groups, each with its own network.
To pin down the number of groups, suppose that each ethnic group faces a xed cost of
entry that is increasing in the number of groups. Assume that resources, X; are non-excludable.
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This is a reasonable assumption, given that X in the initial period, when the Midwest was being
settled, would have been largely determined by transportation infrastructure that was available
to everyone. Because larger X is associated with a larger surplus, it follows that more groups
would have entered resource-rich counties. As the number of groups increases, the population
share of each group i; Si; mechanically declines. A standard measure of market entry is one
minus the Herndahl Index of market concentration, 1 Pi S2i , and this will be used as a proxy
measure of resource-intensity in the empirical analysis.8
Alternatively, the level of entry, measured by the population density, rather than the
heterogeneity of entry could have been used to capture resource abundance in each county.
One major advantage of the heterogeneity-based measure of resource abundance is that it is
based on the ethnic groups around which labor networks, and the community institutions that
supported these networks, were organized during this period. A second advantage of using the
heterogeneity measure is that it allows us to estimate the long-run e¤ect of initial resources in
each county, net of the scale of production, measured by the initial population, which could have
directly determined the contemporary structure of the local economy through an independent
dynamic process associated with agglomeration externalities. As will become apparent, the
population of a county in 1860 has a signicant e¤ect on the contemporary population level.
Thus the estimates of the e¤ect of resource-intensity in 1860 on contemporary outcomes must
account for the potentially confounding e¤ect of the initial population level in each county.9
Table 1 describes the ethnic shares used in the construction of the resource measure in the
initial period. The 1-in-100 individual sample from the Population Census (IPUMS) is used to
compute the ethnic share in each Midwestern county. In the absence of data on ethnic a¢ liation
among native born, ethnic shares are computed using rst-generation migrants whose country
of birth determines their ethnic a¢ liation. In light of the intergenerational persistence in ethnic
migrant networks over this period, these shares are very likely to reect the ethnic composition
in the county as a whole. The English (13 percent), the Irish (25 percent), and the Germans
8When there is a single group in a resource-poor county, the value of this measure is zero. When there
are many groups, this measure increases in size and in the limit approaches one. Greater resource-intensity is
associated with a higher level of community services because of its complementarity with labor and the presence
of network externalities. If networks compete directly with each other, the cost of an individuals exit on members
that remain will be even larger in resource rich (ethnically heterogenous) locations, reinforcing this results.
9 In contrast, a measure based on population density, (i.e., the ratio of population to total county area) will
not permit us to disentangle the long-run e¤ect of initial resources from the population level.
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(32 percent), dominated the migrant labor force in the Midwest in 1860.10 Subsequently, over
the 1860-1900 period, the dominating ethnic groups are the Germans and the Scandinavians.
Given the variety of occupations in this period, as reported in Table 2, and in light of
the di¤erential complementarity between resources and labor across occupations, the resource
measure ought to capture the heterogeneity of entry within each occupation.11 The 1860
resource measure in each county is thus constructed as the weighted average of the heterogeneity
of entry within each occupational category (where the weight is the fraction of migrant workers
in that occupation in the county). However, the results are robust to the use of alternative initial
years (i.e., 1850 and 1870) and to constructing this measure without regard to occupation (Table
A1).12 The resource measure across the Midwest in 1860 is depicted in Figure 5. Evidently,
there exists substantial variation in this measure, as reected by a mean of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.2 across these Midwestern counties.13
 
 
 
Figure 5. Resource intensity in 1860
The resource measure is designed to capture multiple dimensions of resource intensity.
Reassuringly, the constructed resource measure captures resource intensity in each county, as
10No other ethnic group accounted for more than a 3 percent share.
11Although heavy manufacturing and the growth of large cities came later, 40 percent of the migrant jobs in
the 1860 census are already outside the agricultural sector.
12The main results are also robust to the inclusion of a full set of ethnic dummies, excluding the possibility
that settlement of particular ethnic groups in certain counties had a long run e¤ect (Table A1).
13Counties that were not incorporated and those without foreign-born workers in the 1860 sample are unshaded
in the gure.
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reected by transportation infrastructure and land quality. Given the importance of trans-
portation links in the development of the Midwest, counties with access to the railroad system,
as well as counties situated closer to a canal or Great Lakes harbor would have been associ-
ated with a higher level of productive resources.14 Similarly, superior soil quality would have
been associated with higher resource intensity. As established in Column 1 of Table 3, the
constructed resource measure is indeed positively associated with each component of the trans-
portation infrastructure as well as soil quality.15 Furthermore, consistent with the hypothesis
that resources and labor are complements, the relationship between resource intensity and its
determinants (e.g., transportation infrastructure and soil quality) as reported in Column 1,
is qualitatively identical to the relationship between the scale of production in the county,
measured by population, and the same determinants in Column 2.
3.3 Identifying Labor Misallocation
Although the provision of community services by inclusive institutions can be e¢ ciency en-
hancing at the outset, the theory suggests that this can lead to labor misallocation in the
long run. Labor misallocation is identied by exploiting the fact that variation in resource-
intensity across counties was temporary in nature.16 In particular, as will become apparent,
while resource-intensity was conducive for employment in 1860, it is uncorrelated with stan-
dard determinants of contemporary occupational choice. Thus, if one observes that individuals
born in historically resource-rich counties are nevertheless disproportionately represented in
less mobile occupations characterized by lower human capita intensity, without facing a rela-
tive disadvantage with respect to occupation and education opportunities, then this would be
indicative of a labor misallocation.
In a standard model of occupational choice, the occupation that an individual chooses
14Data on the distance to the nearest canal (or navigable river) and the nearest Great Lakes harbor is obtained
from Jordan Rappaports website at the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank. The distance is computed in each
case from the county centroid.
15The transportation infrastructure variables, which are evidently no longer directly salient, are highly jointly-
signicant in Column 1. Underlining the fundamental role of resource-intensity, the e¤ect of historical resource-
intensity on contemporary community participation and occupational choice would grow even larger in (absolute)
magnitude if only the part of the variation in resource-intensity that could be explained by the transportation
infrastructure variables was used in the analysis.
16 If natural land productivity is associated with the emergence of generalized social capital rather than
community-specic social capital, then it may foster mobility and e¢ ciency (Litina (2013)). The results, how-
ever, suggest that this is not the dominating force in the Midwest. Relatedly, historical land inequality could
have led land owners to implement persistent mobility reducing institutions (Galor et al., (2009)). As noted,
extractive institutions have not emerged in the Midwest. Hence, not surprisingly, as reported in Table A1, the
result are una¤ected once the potentially confounding e¤ects of historical land inequality are accounted for.
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will depend on the supply of occupations in the local area and the cost of investing in human
capital, reecting individuals ability and school quality. To identify a labor misallocation,
1860 resource-intensity must be therefore uncorrelated with each of these determinants of oc-
cupational choice today. Initial support for the claim that reduced mobility in historically
resource-rich counties cannot be attributed to standard determinants of occupational choice
is provided in Tables 4 and 5, using county-level data. Additional validation tests, using
individual-level data from the NLSY, are reported in the subsequent section.
First, reduced labor mobility in historically resource rich counties cannot be attributed
to superior contemporary economic conditions. As established in Table 4, resource intensity in
1860 is uncorrelated with 1990 manufacturing share (Column 1), agriculture share (Column 2)
and population (Column 3).17 In contrast, recall from Table 3 that resource intensity in 1860 is
associated with superior economic conditions at that time, as reected by the population of the
county and the sectoral composition of the local economy. Since these economic attributes could
have had persistent e¤ects on economic activity in the long-run, the entire empirical analysis
estimates the e¤ect of resource intensity in 1860 conditional on 1860 population, agriculture
share, and manufacturing share.18
Second, reduced labor mobility in historically resource-rich counties cannot be attributed
to the di¤erential provision of government-provided public goods. As established in Tables 4
and 5, historically resource-rich counties are not characterized by superior government-provided
local amenities or inferior schools. While lower provision of public goods has been attributed
to higher fractionalization in society, in the United States, racial, rather than ethnic or reli-
gious fractionalization in society is associated with lower provision of public goods (Alesina,
Baqir, and Easterly (1999)). As established in Table 4, 1860 resources are uncorrelated with
contemporary racial (Column 4), and ethnic (Column 5) fractionalization and have a negative
association with religious fractionalization (Column 6).19 Hence, as expected, there is no direct
17The manufacturing share in 1990 is dened as the share of the civilian labor force employed in manufacturing
in that year. The agriculture share in 1990 is computed using the farm population and the total population in
the county in that year. All these statistics, as well as the area of each county used to compute the population
density, are obtained from the 1994 County Data Book, compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
18As established in Figure A1, the main results are una¤ected if these controls are removed.
19Ethnic fractionalization is computed from the 1990 IPUMS as one minus the Herndahl index of ethnic
concentration, using the same 16 white ethnic groups as in Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004). Racial fraction-
alization and religious fractionalization are computed from the 1990 IPUMS and the 1990 Census of Religious
Bodies, respectively, using the same ve racial groups and the same 18 religious groups as in Alesina, Baqir, and
Hoxby.
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evidence that historical resource-abundance has resulted in superior government-provided local
amenities or inferior schools. In particular, Table 5 establishes that there is no statistically
signicant association between historical resource-intensity and both public expenditures per
capita and education expenditures per student in 1967, 1977, and 1990.20
Third, reduced labor mobility in historically rich-resource counties cannot be attributed
to lower individual ability in those counties. As established in Column 1 of Table 9, standard-
ized test scores are not associated with historical resources in the county. The absence of
a signicant statistical association between contemporary ability and initial resources in 1860
removes this potential explanation for reduced mobility.21
4 Empirical Results
The theory generates two testable predictions. First, di¤erences in the provision of commu-
nity services between resource-abundant and resource-scarce counties will persist over time.
Second, individuals born in historically high-resource counties will be over-represented in less
mobile occupations, resulting in a misallocation of labor in the long-run. These predictions are
tested by estimating the relationship between the measure of resource intensity in 1860 and
(i) participation over time in community institutions, and (ii) the propensity for mobility and
the associated labor misallocation, as reected by contemporary occupational and educational
choices.
4.1 Church Participation
As predicted by the theory, the empirical analysis establishes that resource abundance in 1860
has a positive and persistent e¤ect on church participation, encouraging members of the local
community to stay. The focus on church participation reects the fact that churches were
among the rst community institutions to be established when European immigrants arrived
in the Midwest (Hoerder (1991), Bodnar, Simon, and Weber (1982)). [Migrants] from varying
regions formed a community based on common nationality and religion centered on the central
cultural institution the church(Gjerde (1991): 176).
20Data on expenditures is obtained from the Annual Survey of Governments. School enrollment is obtained
from the population census.
21Reduced labor mobility in historically-rich resource counties could potentially be attributed to the sort-
ing of individuals with greater inate attachment to local communities (with superior community institutions).
This potential sorting, however, has no bearing on the presence of labor misallocation as long as this trait is
uncorrelated with ability. These individuals are less mobile despite being equally able.
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Historically, the church congregation provided various forms of mutual assistance includ-
ing credit, insurance, job referrals, business information, and social support (Gjerde (1985),
Alexander (1991)). Indeed, it has been argued that the participation of early immigrants to
the Midwest in their local churches was primarily motivated by the economic and social services
they provided, rather than by belief or ideology (Bodnar (1985)). Midwestern churches have
continued to provide important forms of social support for their members over the subsequent
150 years. Church activities have included Sunday school service, youth groups, pot-lucks,
informal home parties, and food, visits, and other forms of support when members of the con-
gregation are ailing or inrm. The church also lies at the center of a cluster of inter-linked civic
institutions, including the school and various voluntary organizations, that emerged over time.
Life in a Midwest community revolves around these institutions, bringing families and friends
together on a regular basis (Elder and Conger (2000)). Although other institutions, such as
parochial schools, play a role in building an attachment to the local community, the initial
focus on the church reects its central position in community life and the availability of data
on church participation at the county level, by denomination, from the Census of Religious
Bodies (CRB) at roughly ten-year intervals from 1860 till the present.22
In the presence of heterogeneity in the cost of participation, the theory implies that
the participation rate will reect the level of services provided by the community institution.
Thus church participation-rates are expected to be persistently higher in resource-rich coun-
ties. Consistent with this prediction, as depicted in Figure 6, resource intensity in 1860 has
a positive and signicant e¤ect on church participation (by 1890) growing steadily thereafter
and remaining statistically signicant all the way through 2000.23
Church participation in the Midwest has remained at roughly 55 percent of the population
over the 1860-2000 period. However, this stability masks substantial variation in the mix of
denominations over time. Five denominations Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist, and
Presbyterian account for nearly 80 percent of church participants over the 1860-2000 period.
Among these denominations, the Catholics and Lutherans grew substantially in popularity,
22The CRB was conducted as part of the population census from 1860 to 1890, with census enumerators
collecting information from individual churches in each county. Subsequently, the U.S. Bureau of the Census
conducted the CRB separately from the population census in ten-year intervals from 1906 to 1936. Starting
from 1952, the National Council of Churches of Christ undertook the responsibility of conducting the CRB, with
subsequent census rounds in 1972, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
23Figure 6 and 7 depict the relationship between 1860 resource-abundance and church participation in each
census year between 1870 to 2000, net of population, manufacturing share, and agriculture share in 1860.
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accounting for 33 percent and 20 percent of all church participants by 2000, while the other
denominations (especially the Methodists and Presbyterians) faced a corresponding decline.
Figure 6. The e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 on
the time path of church participation
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Figure 7. The e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 on
the time path of church participation by denomination
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Based on the country of origin of the rst-generation migrants, reported in Table 1, most
migrant churches would have been Catholic or Lutheran.24 Economic networks and social
support systems are especially important for new entrants in an economy. Since this is the
motivation for the provision of community services, the theory should be most applicable for
migrant communities, who were disproportionately Catholic and the Lutheran in 1860. The
persistently higher church participation in historically resource-rich counties observed in Figure
6 is indeed driven by participation in Catholic and Lutheran churches in those counties. As
established in Column 1 of Table 6 for the year 2000, and as depicted for the entire time period
in Figure 7, resource-abundance in 1860 had a positive and signicant e¤ect on the share of
Catholics and Lutherans in the population; an e¤ect that remains at least as large over time.25
A one standard deviation increase in 1860 resource intensity would increase the population
share of Catholics and Lutherans in the county by four percentage points in 2000 (an increase
of 22 percent). In contrast, as established in Column 2 of Table 6 for the year 2000, and as
depicted for the entire time period in Figure 7, the e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 is much
smaller and negative, but remains signicant and stable over time for other denominations.
The CRB provides information on church participation among residents of the county.
To study the e¤ect of historical resource intensity on church participation among individuals
born in the county, we turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY
consists of a nationally representative sample of American high school seniors in 1979 who
were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter. A unique feature of the
NLSY, which is especially relevant for the analysis, is the availability of the county of birth
for each respondent. Matching the patterns established in Columns 1-2, and in Figure 7, with
the CRB, the results from the NLSY indicate that individuals born in historically resource-
rich counties are signicantly more likely to be raised as Lutherans or Catholics (Column 3),
whereas 1860 resource-abundance has a negative e¤ect of a much smaller magnitude for other
24Apart from the Germans and the Irish, the English were also an important migrant group in 1860. Although
it is possible that many of the English were Anglican (Episcopalian), this denomination accounts for just 3 percent
of church participants in 1860 and never has a signicant presence in the Midwest.
25This pattern is obtained for Catholics and Lutherans individually. The 1860-1890 census rounds collected
information on the number of church seats by denomination in each county. From 1890 onwards, information
was collected on the number of members directly, and from 1972 onwards the number of adherents was collected
as well. We use church seats rather than members to measure participation in 1890 because it is more in line
with trends in participation over time and we use adherents rather than members to measure participation in the
1972-2000 census rounds because membership information for the Catholics is unavailable in that period. The
1860 resource coe¢ cient increases steadily over time and not in three distinct steps, so our results are unlikely
to be driven by changes in the participation measure.
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denominations (Column 4).26
4.2 Parochial School Enrollment
The focus on the church in the analysis of community participation reects the role that this
institution has occupied in community life from the time the Midwest was developed. Indeed,
the importance of the church is a common thread running through historical accounts of the set-
tlement of this region. Other institutions, such as parochial schools, that subsequently formed
around the church would also have contributed to building community ties. The prediction of
the theory is that individuals born in historically resource-rich counties are more likely to have
been exposed to these socializing institutions in childhood as well. This section thus begins
by estimating the relationship between enrollment in parochial schools (which are primarily
Catholic and Lutheran in the Midwest) and the indicator of resource-abundance in 1860.
Consistent with the prediction of the theory, as established in Table 7, resource-abundance
in 1860 has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the share of students enrolled in parochial schools
in 1970 (Column 1) and in 1980 (Column 2). A standard deviation increase in resource in-
tensity in 1860 would increase the parochial-school share in each of the periods by 0.014 (20
percent).27 While the 1970 and 1980 Population Censuses report parochial school enrolment
at the county level, this information was not collected on the 1990 round. However, all three
rounds collected information on private school enrolment. Parochial schools account for the
bulk of private schooling in the Midwest (73% of private school enrolment in 1970 and 74% in
1980). The share of private school enrollment in 1990 can thus be used as a proxy for parochial
schools enrolment in that year. As established in Column 3-5 of Table 7, resource-abundance
in 1860 had a positive, signicant and stable e¤ect on the share of students enrolled in private
school in the years 1970, 1980, and 1990. Moreover, the coe¢ cients in Columns 3 and 4 are
nearly identical in magnitude to those in Columns 1 and 2, respectively, indicating that the
e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 on private school enrollment is indeed a good proxy for
its e¤ect on parochial school enrolment.
The results on parochial schooling, together with the results presented on church par-
26The NLSY collects information on the respondents county of birth and the religious denomination they
were raised in. To be consistent with the results using the CRB, we aggregate the individual data in the NLSY
to the county level. The regressors in all columns include our 1860 resource-measure and the usual county
characteristics.
27The 1970 and 1980 population censuses provide county-level information on the total number of children
enrolled in school (grades K-12) as well as the number of children enrolled in parochial schools.
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ticipation, indicate that individuals growing up in historically resource-rich counties have been
more likely to participate in specic community institutions associated with the provision of
community services. The consistency of the results on church participation and parochial
school enrollment, obtained with three independent data sources (i.e., the CRB, NLSY, and
Population Census) further increases condence in the persistent e¤ects of initial di¤erences in
community institutions.
4.3 Reduced Mobility and Labor Misallocation
The second prediction of the theory is that in the long run, individuals born in historically
resource-rich counties are more likely to select into occupations associated with low mobility,
that are less demanding in terms of human capital accumulation, giving rise to a labor misal-
location. This prediction is tested using the NLSY, which species the county of birth for each
individual as well as residential location in the year 2000.28
As established in Table 8, individuals born in historically resource-rich counties are indeed
less likely to migrate from their county of birth by the year 2000 and sort into less mobile
occupations. As reported in Column 1, a standard deviation increase in historical resource
intensity reduces the migration rate by 8 percentage points to fty percent (i.e., a fourteen
percent decline). Moreover, the e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 on the average migration
rate in the individuals occupation (Column 2) and on the average college completion in that
occupation (Column 3) is indeed negative and signicant.29
The documented selection into less mobile, less demanding occupations is only indicative
of a labor misallocation if the availability of jobs in mobile occupations and the e¤ectiveness
of investments in human capital do not vary across counties with di¤erent historical resource
intensities. As has been shown in Table 4 and 5, historical resource-intensity is uncorrelated
with local economic conditions, public goods expenditures per capita, and public education
expenditures per student. Moreover, previous research indicates that Catholic schools, which
make up the bulk of parochial schools, provide higher quality education than public schools
(Evans and Schwab (1995), Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005)). Since students in historically
resource-rich counties are signicantly more likely to be enrolled in parochial schools, this would
28 Importantly, the focus on the year 2000 assures that the respondents who were rst sampled in the year
1979 are old enough to be settled in their careers and to potentially experience occupation related migration.
29Migration and college completion are strongly correlated across occupations (the correlation is 0.6).
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suggest that they actually have access to schools of superior quality.
As an additional conrmatory test we establish that individuals residing in historically
resource-rich counties in 2000, regardless of their place of birth, are employed in occupations
that are as mobile than those of their counterparts residing in historically resource-poor coun-
ties. Reassuringly, as reported in Column 5, focusing on the county of residence, the e¤ect
of resource-abundance in 1860 on the average migration rate in the individuals occupation is
statistically insignicant and much smaller in magnitude than the corresponding coe¢ cient in
Column 2. In addition, the e¤ect of resource-abundance in 1860 on average college completion
in the individuals occupation changes sign from Column 3, and is positive and marginally signif-
icant in Column 6. These results establish that individuals residing and working in historically
resource-rich counties are engaged in occupations that are at least as mobile and educationally
demanding as the occupations available to individuals in historically resource-poor counties.
Moreover, as reported in Column 4 and 7, individuals born in historically resource-rich coun-
ties earn signicantly lower income, despite the fact that income in their county of birth is not
signicantly lower. The fact that individuals born in those counties nevertheless select into less
mobile occupations is thus indicative of labor misallocation.
Finally, to dismiss the possibility that di¤erences in occupational choice across counties
are driven by di¤erences in the ability distribution, the analysis proceeds to examine the rela-
tionship between measures of educational attainment and schooling choices obtained from the
NLSY and 1860 resources intensity. As reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 9, 1860 resource-
abundance does not have a statistically signicant e¤ect on AFQT scores, high school comple-
tion, and college completion. Apart from being statistically insignicant, the point estimates
are extremely small in magnitude.30 Interestingly, individuals born in historically resource-rich
counties are signicantly less likely to attend college out of state (Column 4). This choice
keeps them closer to home while in college and most likely reduces their mobility when they do
graduate. Reinforcing this pattern, individuals born in historically resource abundant counties
also select into majors associated with signicantly lower migration, conditional on completing
college (Column 5).31 As established in Table A2 and A3, the e¤ects on migration, occupa-
30Based on the imprecisely measured point estimates, a one standard deviation increase in 1860 resource
intensity would reduce AFQT scores by 0.6 points. As a basis for comparison, the black-white gap is 25 points.
The same change in 1860 resource intensity would lower the probability of high school completion by 0.01 and
the probability of college completion by 0.02.
31These individuals could select into majors associated with higher migration and then forego the benets
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tional choice and educational attainment (Table 8 and 9) are robust to the inclusion of a AFQT
scores as a proxy for individual ability.
5 Conclusion
This research advances the hypothesis that economies characterized by a socially cohesive
workforce and network externalities gave rise to a particular variety of e¢ ciency-enhancing
inclusive institutions, designed to restrict mobility and to increase the attachment of community
members to the local labor market. However, their persistence, and the inter-generational
transmission of their value, ultimately led to the misallocation of talents across occupations
and a reduction in the long-run level of income per capita in the economy as a whole.
Exploiting variation in resource intensity across the American Midwest during its initial
development process, the empirical analysis establishes that higher initial resource-intensity in
1860 is indeed associated with greater community participation over the subsequent 150 years,
and reduced mobility and labor misallocation in the contemporary period.
that come with higher mobility over the course of their careers. By the same argument, individuals could select
into more mobile occupations and subsequently choose not to move as new opportunities arise. The returns to
these relative remunerative careers could nevertheless be dominated by the returns in alternative less mobile
occupations if the training costs in human-capital intensive careers are relatively high.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Maximizing (16), the optimal level of investment in the provision of
public goods must satisfy the condition
(1  )(+ )X1 (Lct)+ 1
@Lct
@gt
g0(vt) = 1: (26)
As follows from (A1), noting from (7) that wG   gt = wct = X1 (Lct)+ 1;
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 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Using (27), it follows that the optimal level of vt is given by
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)
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: (28)
As established in (14), Lct = L(gt;X) > 0 for all gt  0; and therefore
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To derive the second part of the Lemma, note from (14) that,
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It thus follows from (28) that
g0(vt) =
(1    )  wG   gt 11  
(1  )(+ )
+
1  X
1 
1  
: (32)
Noting that gt = g(vt) + gt 1;
[(1  )(+ )]
+
1  
g0(vt)

wG   g(vt)  gt 1
 1
+ 1 = (1    )X 1 + 1 ; (33)
and therefore
@vt
@X
=   X
2 2 
+ 1
(+ )
+
1   
wG g(vt)  gt 1
 2  
+ 1 fg"(vt)

wG g(vt)  gt 1

+ 11   [g0(vt)]2g
:
(34)
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Noting that wG   gt > 0 (as follows from (A2)), it follows that
@vt
@X
> 0 if and only if [g"(vt)

wG   g(vt)  gt 1

+
1
1     [g
0(vt)]2] < 0: (35)
Hence, since g(vt) = v

t , where  2 (0; 1); noting that wG   g(vt)  gt 1 = wct ;
@vt
@X
> 0 if g(vt) <
(1    )(1  )

wct : (36)
Thus dv=dX > 0 if g(vt) < wcmin; where   (1    )(1  )= < 1:
Similarly, noting that wG   gt > 0;
@vt
@gt 1
=  

1   g
0(vt)
g"(vt) [ wG   gt] + 11   [g0(vt)]2
> 0; (37)
if and only if [g"(vt)

wG   gt

+ 11   [g
0(vt)]2] < 0; and therefore if if g(vt) < wcmin:
Moreover,
@2vt
@g2t 1
=
h

1   g"(vt)
i h
 fg"(vt)

wG   gt

+ 11   [g
0(vt)]
2g
i
+
h

1   g
0(vt)
i
[g"(vt)]h
 fg"(vt) [ wG   gt] + 11   [g0(vt)]2g
i2 < 0:
(38)
Proof of Lemma 2. As derived in (18), gt+1 = g(v(X; gt)) + gt   (gt;X); and
 (0;X) = g(v(X; 0)) > 0; (39)
as established in Lemma 1. Moreover, as follows from (9), (27), and Lemma 1,
 g(gt;X) = [g
0(vt+1)vg(X; gt) + 1] > 0;
 x(gt;X) = g
0(vt+1)vx(X; gt) > 0;
 gg(gt;X) = [g"(vt+1)vg(X; gt) + g
0(vt+1)vgg(X; gt)] < 0:
(40)
Hence, as depicted in Figure 2,  (gt;X) has a unique intersection with the 450 line and thus
there exists a unique and globally stable steady-state equilibrium,
g = g(v(X; g)) + g   (g;X): (41)
where
dg
dX
=
g0(v)vg(X; g))dg + g0(v)vx(X; g))
(1  ) > 0: (42)
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6.1 Appendix: Robustness Tests
Each of the robustness test includes separate regressions with migration in 2000 (Table 6,
Column 1), the share of Lutherans and Catholics in the population in 2000 (Table 5, Column
1) and the share of children enrolled in parochial schools in 1980 (Table 7, Column 2).32
Panel A demonstrates the robustness of the results for alternative construction of the
historical resource variable. Columns 1-6 report estimates based on resource intensity measured
in the year 1850 and 1870, rather than 1860. Subsequently, Columns 7-9 provide that estimates
for a more accurate resource measure, excluding all counties with less than 20 observations in
the 1860 IPUMS (approximately 10 percent of the sample).
Panel B further demonstrates the robustness of the results for alternative construction of
the historical resource variable.. The statistic that we use in the regressions reported thus far is
constructed by averaging across occupations. Results with the corresponding resource measure,
constructed without regard to occupation, are reported in Columns 1-3. Table 9 concludes
with specications that include historical characteristics that could potentially determine the
outcomes of interest and are correlated with 1860 resource intensity as additional regressors.
The population share of each nationality in the 1860 census (computed at the county level)
is included in Columns 4-6 to allow for the possibility that particular ethnicities rather than
overall resource intensity determine the outcomes. Although the focus is on the role played by
inclusive community institutions in discouraging mobility, an alternative explanation is that
large landowners in historically resource-rich counties restricted labor mobility to maximize
their rents, with these restrictions persisting over time with the support of extractive local
institutions. The Midwest, unlike the American South, is not typically associated with such
institutions and, not surprisingly, the Gini coe¢ cient included as a regressor to measure land
inequality in 1860 has no e¤ect on long-run outcomes in Columns 7-9.
The results in Table 9 indicate that the 1860 resource coe¢ cient remains signicant at
the 5 percent level and is very stable across the alternative specications. As a nal robustness
test, conditional and unconditional estimates of the nonparametric relationship between the
three outcomes and 1860 resources are depicted in Figure A3.33 The individuals in the NLSY
32To preserve space, we only report the 1860 resource coe¢ cient for each test in Table 9.
33The solid line in the gure is the conditional estimate, with additional regressors partialled out nonparamet-
rically, while the dashed line is the unconditional estimate. The Epanechnikov kernel function is used in Figure
8.
32
counties are drawn from 150 of our approximately 400 counties, so it is unlikely that a few
outlying counties are driving any of the results. It is nevertheless reassuring to observe that
the relationships reported earlier with the linear parametric regressions hold up across the entire
range of the 1860 resource variable. The population share of Catholics and Lutherans and the
share of students enrolled in parochial schools double over this range, while the migration rate
declines by nearly 50 percent, emphasizing the importance of the e¤ects uncovered.
Figure A1. Historical Resource Intensity and Contemporary Outcomes
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Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
Scandinavia
Danish 0.01 0.02 0.02
Norwegian 0.03 0.07 0.07
Swedish 0.02 0.06 0.10
British Isles
English 0.13 0.11 0.09
Irish 0.25 0.19 0.11
Scottish 0.03 0.03 0.02
Welsh 0.01 0.01 0.01
Western Europe
Dutch 0.01 0.01 0.01
French 0.03 0.02 0.01
German 0.32 0.37 0.41
Swiss 0.02 0.02 0.02
Eastern Europe
Czech 0.00 0.01 0.02
Polish 0.00 0.01 0.02
Other 0.14 0.07 0.09
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals.
Census year: 1860 1880 1900
(1) (2) (3)
White collar
Professional 0.04 0.04 0.05
Manager 0.04 0.04 0.06
Clerical 0.00 0.01 0.02
Sales 0.01 0.02 0.03
Farm
Farmer 0.50 0.41 0.31
Laborer, Farm 0.12 0.17 0.17
Blue collar, nonfarm
Craftsman 0.10 0.08 0.09
Operative 0.05 0.08 0.09
Household Service 0.05 0.05 0.05
Service 0.00 0.01 0.02
Laborer, Non-Farm 0.09 0.10 0.12
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: IPUMS 1:100 sample, including all foreign-born individuals
who report that they are employed and report an occupational category.
Table 1: Ethnic Distribution, 1860-1900
Table 2: Occupational Distribution, 1860-1900
resource manufacturing agriculture
Dependent variable: intensity population share share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Railroad through county, 1860 0.038 0.098 0.009 -0.026
(0.021) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)
Distance to canal, 1890 -0.498 -0.418 0.060 0.157
(0.191) (0.112) (0.081) (0.113)
Distance to Great Lakes harbor -0.291 -0.148 -0.041 0.057
(0.069) (0.057) (0.023) (0.046)
Land quality 0.157 0.047 -0.102 0.176
(0.069) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037)
Joint sig. of transport variables
F statistic 11.13 34.99 3.38 3.94
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Observations 401 401 401 401
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Distance to canal and distance to Great Lakes harbor measured in thousands of kilometers.
Land quality is county mean of 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree soil suitability measure from Ramankutty et al (2002).
Manufacturing share and agriculture share in 1860 computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
Year:
agric manufac racial ethnic religious
Dependent variable: share share pop frac frac frac
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource intensity, 1860 0.003 0.018 -0.269 0.011 -0.027 -0.124
(0.015) (0.020) (0.854) (0.017) (0.113) (0.034)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.090 -0.056 1.636 0.084 0.176 -0.257
(0.038) (0.053) (1.063) (0.055) (0.309) (0.110)
Agriculture share, 1860 0.136 0.057 -0.962 -0.080 0.049 -0.119
(0.027) (0.037) (0.746) (0.030) (0.225) (0.074)
Population, 1860 -0.087 0.030 11.716 0.246 0.326 0.124
(0.031) (0.026) (5.372) (0.052) (0.110) (0.076)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Manufacturing share in 1990 defined as share of civilian labor force employed in manufacturing.
Agriculture share in 1990 is computed using farm population and total population in county.
Ethnic fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of (white) ethnic concentration based on 16 ethnicities.
Racial fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of racial concentration based on 5 racial groups.
Religious fractionalization in 1990 is one minus the Herfindahl index of religious concentration based on 18 denominations.
1990
Table 4: County Characteristics, 1990
Table 3: County Characteristics, 1860
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares,  
averaged across occupations.
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares,  
averaged across occupations.
Dependent variable:
Year: 1967 1977 1990 1967 1977 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Resource intensity, 1860 0.059 0.168 0.143 -0.072 0.274 0.379
(0.059) (0.091) (0.145) (0.119) (0.187) (0.279)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.082 0.168 0.431 0.027 1.058 1.669
(0.167) (0.311) (0.469) (0.443) (0.594) (0.848)
Agriculture share, 1860 0.081 -0.291 -0.042 0.317 0.044 -0.452
(0.146) (0.215) (0.410) (0.343) (0.425) (0.617)
Population, 1860 -0.121 0.055 0.168 0.013 0.781 0.032
(0.132) (0.175) (0.160) (0.235) (0.388) (0.312)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Education expenditure per student is total public spending on grades K-12 (measured in thousands of 1990 dollars) divided
by total public school enrollment grades K-12.
Data set:
Dependent variable:
1860 variables measured in:
Church denomination: Catholic/Lutheran other Catholic/Lutheran other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resource intensity, 1860 0.216 -0.091 0.224 -0.132
(0.049) (0.027) (0.113) (0.139)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.464 -0.182 0.341 -0.014
(0.134) (0.066) (0.317) (0.381)
Agriculture share, 1860 0.314 0.056 0.125 -0.207
(0.103) (0.065) (0.229) (0.255)
Population, 1860 -0.229 0.063 -0.111 0.119
(0.103) (0.031) (0.089) (0.089)
Observations 437 437 222 222
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
education expenditures per student
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared 
Table 5: Public Goods Expenditures
CRB NLSY
county of birth
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared 
Table 6: Church participation in 2000
share of county participating in 
church denomination
county of residence
share of sample raised in 
church denomination
local public expenditures per capita
Dependent variable:
Year: 1970 1980 1970 1980 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Resource intensity, 1860 0.071 0.070 0.077 0.080 0.075
(0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Manufacturing share, 1860 0.126 0.072 0.138 0.088 0.075
(0.049) (0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.040)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.014 -0.016 -0.025 -0.015 0.001
(0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.034) (0.029)
Population, 1860 0.025 0.050 0.046 0.064 0.064
(0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares, 
   averaged across occupations.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Parochial school share is parochial school enrollment grades K-12 divided by school enrollment grades K-12.
Private school share is private school enrollment grades K-12 divided by school enrollment grades K-12.
1860 variables measured in:
Dependent variable: migrated
avg migration 
in occupation
avg college 
completion in 
occupation income
avg migration 
in occupation
avg college 
completion in 
occupation income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Resource intensity, 1860 -0.414 -0.127 -0.188 -9.513 -0.010 0.123 -4.444
(0.138) (0.062) (0.084) (5.547) (0.058) (0.076) (5.201)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.242 -0.178 -0.407 -21.01 0.159 0.272 -18.41
(0.260) (0.120) (0.190) (11.30) (0.096) (0.218) (9.293)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.317 -0.127 -0.377 -14.63 0.179 0.232 -1.964
(0.222) (0.089) (0.134) (8.670) (0.078) (0.122) (7.507)
Population, 1860 0.065 0.030 0.030 1.544 0.002 0.037 3.761
(0.040) (0.014) (0.024) (1.501) (0.013) (0.017) (1.344)
White 0.284 0.089 0.091 5.284 0.016 0.094 5.239
(0.052) (0.018) (0.013) (1.454) (0.021) (0.020) (1.400)
Female -0.014 -0.002 0.002 -13.60 -0.012 0.010 -13.99
(0.024) (0.013) (0.014) (1.072) (0.012) (0.013) (1.072)
Age 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.181 0.003 0.005 0.384
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.292) (0.003) (0.003) (0.246)
Observations 1437 1216 1216 1096 1237 1237 1113
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares,     
    averaged across occupations.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
Annual income in 2000 in thousands of dollars. Top 5% of the income distribution is truncated.
Table 7: Education (Population Census)
Table 8: Mobility in 2000 (NLSY)
parochial school share
county of birth county of residence
private school share
Dependent variable: AFQT score
high school 
completion college completion college out of state
average migration 
in college major
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Resource intensity, 1860 -3.185 -0.056 -0.120 -0.386 -0.242
(8.695) (0.082) (0.126) (0.187) (0.094)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -14.421 -0.185 -0.347 -0.686 -0.077
(19.737) (0.180) (0.241) (0.338) (0.143)
Agriculture share, 1860 -17.311 -0.269 -0.477 -0.665 0.110
(17.015) (0.178) (0.198) (0.306) (0.165)
Population, 1860 -3.028 -0.061 -0.009 0.018 0.026
(2.039) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.033)
White 25.469 0.043 0.128 0.021 0.041
(1.724) (0.024) (0.021) (0.039) (0.056)
Female -3.314 0.005 -0.041 0.019 0.004
(1.893) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023)
Age 2.642 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.0009
(0.366) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1390 1437 1437 814 289
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
     averaged across occupations.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Ethnic competition, manufacturing share, and agricultural share measured in county of birth.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
AFQT is the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
High school completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed high school, including GED.
College completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed a four-year college/university degree.
Average migation in college major is the proportion of individuals in the respondents' college major who reside
   outside of their counties of birth.
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares, 
Table 9: Education (NLSY)
Dependent variable: a b c a b c a b c
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Resource intensity, 1860 0.356 -0.368 0.102 0.361 -0.292 0.075 0.288 -0.410 0.081
(0.053) (0.121) (0.015) (0.050) (0.195) (0.012) (0.051) (0.169) (0.012)
Observations 290 1157 290 517 1471 517 415 1417 415
Robustness test
Resource intensity, 1860 0.120 -0.422 0.055 0.095 -0.482 0.034 0.127 -0.459 0.056
(0.047) (0.136) (0.012) (0.049) (0.178) (0.013) (0.048) (0.129) (0.012)
Observations 437 1437 437 437 1437 437 432 1437 432
Robustness test
Notes: Dependent variable "a" is share of Catholics and Lutherans in the population in 2000 (CRB data at the county level).
Dependent variable "b" is migrated by 2000 (NLSY data at the individual level).
Dependent variable "c" is share of students in parochial schools in 1980 (population census at the county level).
In individual-level regressions, standard errors in parentheses clustered at the county level.
In county-level regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include 1860 manufacturing share, 1860 agricultural share, and 1860 population as regressors.
Individual-level regressions with migrated as the dependent variable include white, female, and age as additional regressors.
Population share of each ethnicity in 1860 and Gini coefficient of land inequality in 1860 are included as regressors in Panel B, Columns 4-9.
no occupation categories pop share of each ethnicity Gini as additional regressor
Table A1: Robustness Tests
Panel A: Alternative construction of resource measure, 1860
Panel B: Alternative construction of resource measure and additional regressors, 1860
resource intensity, 1850 resource intensity, 1870 exclude counties w/ less than 20 obs, 1860
1860 variables measured in:
Dependent variable: migrated
avg migration 
in occupation
avg college 
completion in 
occupation income
avg migration 
in occupation
avg college 
completion in 
occupation income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Resource intensity, 1860 -0.410 -0.116 -0.178 -10.19 -0.025 0.079 -6.448
(0.147) (0.070) (0.089) (4.836) (0.059) (0.061) (4.515)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.225 -0.130 -0.358 -19.54 0.168 0.282 -16.08
(0.270) (0.136) (0.186) (9.449) (0.086) (0.149) (6.723)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.297 -0.064 -0.286 -9.65 0.196 0.257 -0.611
(0.209) (0.098) (0.135) (7.211) (0.072) (0.101) (6.257)
Population, 1860 0.069 0.040 0.057 2.942 0.003 0.050 4.608
(0.040) (0.015) (0.023) (1.096) (0.013) (0.015) (1.059)
White 0.221 0.054 -0.001 -0.538 -0.007 0.003 0.044
(0.052) (0.020) (0.014) (1.344) (0.021) (0.018) (1.380)
Female -0.006 0.002 0.022 -12.67 -0.011 0.022 -13.45
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (1.109) (0.013) (0.012) (1.063)
Age 0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.488 0.00001 -0.004 -0.129
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.260) (0.003) (0.003) (0.245)
AFQT score 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.245 0.001 0.004 0.213
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.023) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.019)
Observations 1390 1176 1176 1062 1193 1193 1074
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of squared ethnic shares,     
    averaged across occupations.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population divided by 100,000.
AFQT is the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
Annual income in 2000 in thousands of dollars. Top 5% of the income distribution is truncated.
county of birth county of residence
Table A2: Mobility in 2000 (Controlling for AFQT)
Dependent variable:
high school 
completion college completion college out of state
average migration 
in college major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Resource intensity, 1860 -0.044 -0.074 -0.422 -0.263
(0.075) (0.123) (0.179) (0.103)
Manufacturing share, 1860 -0.089 -0.219 -0.703 -0.061
(0.151) (0.256) (0.320) (0.157)
Agriculture share, 1860 -0.176 -0.346 -0.653 0.260
(0.148) (0.199) (0.303) (0.179)
Population, 1860 -0.044 0.011 0.031 0.059
(0.020) (0.027) (0.038) (0.029)
White -0.069 -0.056 0.013 0.046
(0.023) (0.021) (0.040) (0.063)
Female 0.027 -0.016 0.026 0.011
(0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.021)
Age -0.002 -0.009 0.013 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
AFQT score 0.005 0.007 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1390 1390 795 283
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the county level.
    averaged across occupations.
Manufacturing share in 1860 and agriculture share in 1860 are computed using IPUMS.
Population is divided by 100,000.
Ethnic competition, manufacturing share, and agricultural share measured in county of birth.
White, female, and age are individual-level characteristics.
AFQT is the score on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.
High school completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed high school, including GED.
College completion is a binary variable indicating whether the individual completed a four-year college/university degree.
Average migation in college major is the proportion of individuals in the respondents' college major who reside
    outside of their counties of birth.
Table A3: Education (Controlling for AFQT)
Resource intensity is measured by the heterogeneity of (ethnic) entry: one minus the sum of 
